Abstract
A prominent new method of conceiving and measuring well-being within the hedonic tradition is under development: ecological momentary assessment (EMA). This development is due to two findings: the traditional way to conceive of utility as preference satisfaction does not reliably map well-being, since the things we prefer do not always give us pleasure and some things we do not prefer sometimes do. We need, therefore, to look into our minds to see what really makes us feel happy. But second, measures of well-being based on subjective global reports about well-being are susceptible to different kinds of distortion and the results are not always repeatable. EMA is designed to circumvent both these shortcomings: it is experiential, and it measures global well-being indirectly by asking subjects to report their momentary well-being while they are engaged in a broad variety of activities. Because EMA is relatively new, it has not yet been the subject of much philosophical discussion. A close systematic survey of the EMA research program should investigate how it fares in the light of philosophical criticism directed at traditional experiential conceptions of well-being. But, on the other hand, up to date empirical research on well-being may force philosophers to reconsider some of their conceptual assumptions.