Abstract
Recent research in cognitive neuroscience and psychology has sparked an increasing trend in philosophy towards grounding moral theory in empirical studies of human agency. In these discussions, authors regularly single out the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as their paradigmatic opponent who refuses to ?bow to the empirical facts?. Their dismissal of Kant, the champion of efforts at grounding morality in a rational principle, serves to indicate the futility of any non-empirical grounding of morality. In these debates, the criticisms of Kant display a striking lack of attention to what Kant actually says about empirical knowledge of human agency and its significance for morality. Equally striking is the fact that Kant scholars and Kantian moral theorists, too, have neglected these aspects of his work. Kantian moral theorists seem to believe that their approach, according to which the criterion for moral agency is a rational principle, makes empirical facts about agency normatively irrelevant and hence simply uninteresting to their philosophical project. Moreover, the formulations and examples of Kant?s own empirical account of human action look outdated when compared, say, to current work in psychology. The proposed program focuses on Kant?s views on the relation between morality and empirical knowledge of human agency. By providing a detailed account of Kant?s views on the topic and by assessing their philosophical strength, it aims to challenge both the standard criticisms mentioned above and the neglect, in current Kant scholarship and Kantian ethics, of Kant?s own pertinent views. The proposed program comprises two complementary projects: (1) an in-depth study of Kant?s views on the significance of empirical knowledge of human agency for moral theory and practice, and (2) a new approach to Kant?s non-empirical grounding of morality. The applicant will write a synthesizing study.