Abstract
The issue of whether knowledge ought to be shared is discussed in a variety of local and discipline-specific contexts: ethical debates over privacy, legal debates over intellectual property, political debates over public accountability. This research project establishes a foundational framework for the evaluation of these local and particular research themes. It demonstrates, by arguments from the nature of communication and from requirements built into the concept of knowledge that there is a default norm that knowledge ought to be shared. It makes a distinctive contribution to an emerging field located at the intersection of ethics, the theory of knowledge, and the philosophy of language. This project also investigates the ways in which violations of the default norm would constitute an epistemic wrong, defined as an injustice suffered by an individual specifically in his or her capacity as a knower. It is argued that the frustration of intellectual creativity, curiosity and empowerment of the individual is a moral wrong. Case studies from the discipline of law will be discussed both to determine the extent to which knowledge should be shared and to map out principled exceptions to the default norm. These case studies are then argued to be representative of how the foundational approach may be applied more widely, not only in ethics and law, but also in management, politics and science.