Abstract
The hypothesis of the extended mind (HEM) proposes that objects of the external environ¬ment are used by the human mind in such a way that it is useful to treat them as extensions of the mind itself. Of special interest are cognitive artifacts, i.e. external objects that aid, enhance, replace or improve the brain?s cognitive performance (such as electronic agenda?s, calculators, GPS?s, scientific instruments, computers, search engines on the internet). HEM-theorists propose that, in order to understand human cognition, we should not study the brain alone, but attend to brain-artifact systems instead. Such hybrid systems contain both internal ánd external processes that together do the cognitive work. Despite HEM?s consideration of external cognitive objects, most scholars using the framework (e.g. cognitive psychologists, archaeologists and philosophers) are exclusively interested in improving our understanding of human behavior. This is understandable, since the framework was developed as an alternative to traditional approaches to human cognition. Yet it also means that much potential for employing and testing the hypothesis of the extended mind remains un¬explored. The current project aims to remedy this situation: we examine the merits of HEM with respect to understanding the other component in the brain-artifact system, namely the cognitive artifact. Specifically, we address two issues. First, we analyze the different cognitive (alleged mind-extending) roles that cognitive artifacts can play, and assess how their contribution affects the epistemic status of brain-artifact systems. Secondly, we investigate whether the hypothesis of the extended mind, in at least one of its guises, can be used to repair evolutionary accounts of the history and function of cognitive artifacts.