Abstract
There is a rapidly growing body of empirical studies in cognitive neuroscience and moral psychology that show how our judgments and actions are unconsciously influenced by emotions and situational factors. Many philosophers claim that these findings imply that the notions of free will, character, and moral deliberation are illusions. Yet these notions play a central role in our self-conception as agents and in our social practices of attributing moral and legal respon¬sibility for actions. If the claim that these notions are illusory is correct, this would have significant implications for the legal system and for public policy. This program aims to develop a novel account of the philosophical implications of the empirical findings. It aims to integrate these findings into a strong account of freedom, character, and moral deliberation, by showing how the perspective of the empirical sciences can be reconciled with that of humans as agents who deliberate, act, and hold each other responsible. The program consists of three complementary projects, focussing on the implications of empirical studies of moral agency for the debate about (1) free will, (2) character, and (3) moral reasoning, respectively. The applicant will write a synthesizing monograph.